Corporate Foundations and Ideology by Parmar, I.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Parmar, I. (2017). Corporate Foundations and Ideology. In: G. Baars & A. Spicer 
(Eds.), The Corporation. (pp. 434-447). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 
9781139681025 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/17409/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781139681025.031
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
 
Inderjeet Parmar (City University London): “CORPORATE FOUNDATIONS AND 
IDEOLOGY” 
“The Foundation has a structure and interests, symbolized by the people it picks for trustees and officers, that 
suggest there would, in the long run at least, be limits on our freedom to opt for overly leftist values and objectives, 
to support scholarship that would show how power and wealth is controlled in a given society or what social 
patterns are perpetuated by, for example, the operations of a multinational corporation or the foreign assistance 
programs of the Agency for International Development” (John Farrell, Ford Foundation; emphasis added)1 
 
Introduction 
The ideology of twentieth-century corporate-capitalist democracies, championed by the United 
States – may be characterized broadly as liberal and internationalist. Heavily based on the core 
tenets of ‘Americanism’ – including freedom, limited government, private property, markets, a 
rules-based international system – liberal internationalism has, its champions claim, seen off all 
rivals – fascists and communists alike – and, since the ‘end of history’ around 1990, reigned 
supreme.
2
 However, despite its adherents’ claims, liberal internationalism and Americanism are 
deeply ideological. As Richard Hofstadter claimed long ago, America does not have an ideology, 
it is one.
3
 
The United States, perhaps more than other societies, is central to ‘ideology-free’ ideological 
production and hyper-efficient dissemination. Foundations claim to be scientific, objective, non-
ideological and non-political, beyond the state and big business. In that regard, they attach to the 
longer American pragmatic philosophical tradition the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-
century development of scientific superiority. Hence, foundations claim to pioneer scientific 
giving and scientific management of society, economy and government. It was just a century ago 
that American leadership in disseminating a message was demonstrated – presided over by the 
father of liberal internationalism – President Woodrow Wilson – who gave publicist George 
Creel licence to sell World War I to the American people; and he did so with devastating effect.
4
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But inadvertently, Creel’s massive PR campaign also revealed the other side of the production of 
ideological hegemony – that persuasion alone is insufficient to deliver a pro-war public; Creel’s 
efforts were ably supported by severe repression of anti-war dissenters at every level of 
American society – from the shop-floor to the union hall to the Ivy League university. Coercion 
and persuasion are required to produce ‘consent of the governed’ in ideology-free societies.5 
Ideology is understood here as the development of a world-view that serves specific and 
(slightly) more general interests of a dominant class or elite which produces an elaborate 
structure of thought, morality and practice that renders their dominance ‘natural’ and other class 
views as backward, irrelevant, and extreme.
6
 
Of all the sources of ideological production – the modern political party, church, mass media, 
schools and universities – the corporate foundation is probably the one most frequently neglected 
yet most fundamental. Modern corporate foundations – Rockefeller, Carnegie, Ford, for example 
– are central strategic institutions that are networked with corporate wealth, university-based 
knowledge producers, public affairs organisations, and the state. Indeed, they are pivotal to what 
some scholars argue is a state-private network that owes its origins to the peculiarities of 
American history which, as Stephen Skowronek argues, was born as a democracy without a 
state, in contrast to Europe in the 18
th
 century – states without democracy.7  
This chapter is structured as follows: a brief introduction to the historical context for the rise of 
corporate philanthropy, and some basic information on how they operate, is followed by an 
explanation of the character, functions and elite leadership of knowledge networks. This chapter 
briefly describes the progressive era origins of the major US foundations to establish an essential 
connection between their strategies and the requirements of the political economy of the era. It 
then moves to consider the promotion of free market economics in Chile, the principal bulwark 
of statist industrialization and welfarist democratic strategies in Latin America, as a bridgehead 
into the region during the cold war.
8
 Finally, the chapter considers the role of US foundations in 
the era of capitalist globalization – free market ideological dominance – and in promoting 
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amelioration programmes partly to offset the social devastation that resulted and partly to 
humanize globalization through reducing the democratic deficit in the wake of the supremacy of 
transnational corporations and powerful states. In effect, however, the major foundations are 
ideological in and of themselves as they obscure the destructive nature of the very system (and of 
their role in that system) of which they are beneficiaries and private corporations the drivers.  
Products of the post-Civil War era of rapid industrialization, and the Gilded Age that developed 
from it, the major American foundations reflected the political-economic ethos and requirements 
of their time. They were symptoms of deep anxieties about the possible consequences of 
industrialization, mass immigration and urbanization – processes in Europe that had led to the 
rise of left-wing parties and movements seeking to nationalize the means of production. This 
was, to corporate elites, the very antithesis of Americanism. It was in that context – of the threat 
of populism in the south and west, of organised labour and the left, that corporate elites promoted 
a range of organisations designed to better organize and modernize capitalist democracy for the 
twentieth-century.
9
 The philanthropic foundation was central to scientifically manage social 
change and engineer reform of society, economy, and polity, as well as to develop state power so 
America could aspire to global leadership.
10
 Corporate liberalism developed as the long-term 
strategy to modernize America by developing its political economy to suit the times.
11
 Its 
concepts included a role for the state but always within the remit of developing, consolidating or 
protecting the corporate system. The balance between ‘freedom’ and the ‘state’ was subject to 
shifts according to the times – from growing interventionism in the early 1910s and especially 
during the great depression of the 1930s (the New Deal), WWII, and the internationalization of 
the New Deal through the Bretton Woods system – IMF, World Bank, United Nations, and the 
Marshall Plan. Although in the 1920s, 1950s, and 1980s, there was ‘pushback’ against big 
government, the entire period since the early twentieth-century is characterized by a gradual rise 
of state power central to which is the health and legitimacy of the corporate sector. In the era of 
capitalist globalization, the major foundations – including the philanthrocapitalism of the Gates 
Foundation - championed a softer social neo-liberalism accompanied by attempts to diminish the 
global democratic deficit through promoting global civil society. In short, the major American 
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foundations – in conjunction with the American state – help develop the ideology, and shape the 
institutions that manage, a corporate capitalist society. Having no shareholders or electors to hold 
them accountable, corporate foundations are free to explore, invest, pilot, and experiment with 
new ideas and practices by backing elite think tanks, policy research institutes, university 
research and teaching initiatives, usually linked with state agencies, in order to better manage 
American society and shape others too. The major foundations view real-world societies and 
peoples as laboratories for reform – whether experimenting with eugenics at home in the 1910s, 
free market economics in Chile in the 1950 to the 1970s, or philanthropcapitalism and a new 
‘green revolution’ in Africa today.12  
However, if their ideological conception of the world was dominated by the essential necessity 
and superiority of corporate capitalism, their central method of operation in promoting the 
mindsets that supported that system was the elite knowledge network. The malleability of liberal 
internationalism and the effective power of knowledge networks means that the ideological and 
political power of the major foundations, and their allies, enables them to  elaborate a specific 
kind of thinking to fit the age – from ‘nationalising America’ to Americanising capitalist 
globalization.  
Network building for ideological hegemony 
Integrating elites behind particular ideologically-inspired hegemonic projects has been the 
foundations’ principal long-term function. Foundations have constructed domestic and 
international knowledge networks, both as ends in themselves and as means to their ends. 
Networks are a technology of power that produces significant hegemonic outcomes, “systems of 
coordinated research, disseminated and published results, study and often graduate level 
teaching, intellectual exchange, and financing, across national boundaries.”13 Networks normally 
include official policy-makers and perform two broad but vital functions: internal and external. 
 
Internal functions refer to what the network does as a system of scholar, knowledge, and money 
flows, inter-institutional connections, and as a source of attraction. For example, one of the 
functions of networks is to incorporate and socialise scholars through providing research funds 
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and career-building structures such as professional societies, conferences, and journals. 
Networks build careers and as individuals progress through the ranks, the structural probabilities 
for radically different thinking rapidly diminish. Added to this is the increasingly policy-oriented 
or at least utilitarian character of academic knowledge production – favoured by foundations – 
that scholars are (structurally) socialised or incentivised to conduct. Therefore, such socialising 
structures tend to have politically-moderating effects on scholarship.
14
 
 
External functions refers to the external image of the network’s members as sources of symbolic 
capital, producers of prestigious, legitimate knowledge taken seriously by all, especially policy-
makers.
15
 Foundation-funded knowledge networks clearly regulate the “free” market of ideas, 
the intellectual environment within which “thinkable thought” occurs16 which affects the 
network’s ability to reproduce itself by assimilating new generations of scholars, strengthen self-
awareness, reinforce common language and codes and, importantly, to engage in intellectual 
combat with opponents. A key function – the ‘darker’ side of the publicly-declared purpose of 
philanthropy - is more controversial and is publicly unstated
17
: to bolster US ideological 
hegemony by promoting specific forms of cooperation and integration for achieving 
nationalistic, rather than philanthropic, ends. 
 
Together, the internal and external functions of foundations were/are the basis of elite integration 
and of others’ marginalisation. In periods of crisis, however, when old ideas appear inadequate in 
addressing problems, foundations incorporate critical thinkers to contribute to problem-solving. 
In the process, however, some radicals are incorporated, ‘domesticated’ and rendered “safe”.18 
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Networks distribute material rewards and incentives, bestow status and prestige, that powerfully 
motivate particular kinds of research. Materially and honorifically, networks are hierarchical 
systems. They, therefore, become important sources of symbolic capital and radiate intellectual 
influence. Symbolic capital, in turn, helps strengthen the influence of networks in their role as 
gatekeepers of ideas, bestowers of legitimacy for certain kinds of thinking, implicitly or 
explicitly undermining others. This combines to produce political influence, moving network 
members and organisations closer to the centres of power.  
 
The Big 3 – Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller - behaved this way because they are a part of the 
American ‘power elite’,19 especially significant within the east coast foreign policy 
‘establishment’.20 The major foundations are outgrowths of the corporate giants of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, organisations imbued with the ‘scientific spirit’ of the 
Progressive era.
21
 They mobilised scientific knowledge to manage the potentially catastrophic 
socio-political effects of socio-economic change: industrialisation, mass immigration, 
urbanisation and the attendant rise of radical political movements.
22
 They also pioneered 
scientific ‘giving’, management, and social engineering to inaugurate a reformed economic and 
political order.
23
 
 
As Slaughter and Silva show, in their detailed research on the production of Progressive era 
ideology and practice, the new philanthropic foundations moved quickly to promote certain 
kinds of approaches to social and economic reform while undermining and marginalising 
socialist and other alternatives. This was a largely conscious strategy followed by major new 
foundations including Russell Sage which promoted individual-centred antipoverty programmes 
of social work rather than acknowledging systemic sources of social problems. The Carnegie 
Institute of Washington, for example, advanced an ideology of capitalist reform through its 
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attempts to generate new bodies of economic knowledge that would not only assist development 
of technical competence to aid economic change but also overtly challenge Marxist economic 
ideas.
24
 
 
The Progressive era, therefore, shows the ideological character of the major foundations at their 
very birth. In addition, it showed that consensus was formed by a combination of persuasion and 
coercion: the period of the foundations’ emergence, 1911-16, is considered one of the most 
violent in US history in terms of class conflict. Yet, even the persuasive component of this 
movement was rooted in what we might call hard power as there was massive inequality in the 
distribution of the means of persuasion – the resources at the disposal of the major corporations 
and foundations skewed the so-called free market of ideas towards gross over-representation of a 
particular set of ideas, particularly for globalism and against isolationism. 
 
Additionally, the foundations are unrepresentative elite institutions: their trustees affiliated with 
Wall St. banks and law firms, service in the State Department, connections with the leaders of 
both main political parties, the national press, and ‘Ivy League’ universities.25 Demographically, 
their trustees have been overwhelmingly male, white Anglo-Saxon protestants (Wasps), educated 
at elite schools and universities, and patrons of exclusive clubs.
26
 By the 1920s, such groups 
believed that they, the American elite, had ‘come of age’ and were fit to lead the world: America 
was more advanced industrially and socially, more open and democratic, and generally more 
dynamic. Opposed to moribund empires and atheistic communism, for east coast elites America 
represented a new way forward for a world of peace and prosperity.
27
 American liberal 
internationalism, embedded in American-led international organisations, was the way forward.
28
 
The conception of American global leadership became more concrete during wartime planning 
for a new world after 1945. In particular, the Rockefeller Foundation, among others, funded 
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planning programmes by the Council on Foreign Relations in cooperation with the State 
Department from 1940 onwards. In those war and peace studies projects lay the earliest planning 
for key postwar institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the United Nations. Those 
institutions were central to what CFR planners referred to as the “Grand Area”, the regions of the 
world that they felt were ideally necessary for the economic, political, military and diplomatic 
continuation of the American system of corporate power: the grand area encompassed the whole 
planet barring the Soviet Union (even if the latter was to be ‘contained by a preponderance of 
Western powers on the security council). Due to the great depression of the 1930s and the 
dislocations caused by the Second World War, the master concept was state interventionism to 
reconstruct, develop, and consolidate world trade, finance and production and the global 
institutional architecture – the Bretton Woods system – that would be fundamental to its 
operation as a world system, with the United States at the very pinnacle of the order (with strong 
British cooperation and support).
29
 Yet, the forces of neoliberalism and free market ideology 
were never fully repudiated and the struggle to resurrect laissez faire economics continued and 
was to assume greater significance once the era of ‘planning’ went into crisis in the late 1960s. 
But the planning for that era was begun much earlier and Chile assumes a significant role as a 
laboratory of neoliberal reform. In this, the major US foundations, and state agencies, played key 
roles.   
Pinochet’s economists: Chile as a laboratory for the destruction of statism and 
establishment of neoliberal ideology 
 
There could hardly be a more clear-cut example of a strategy by the United States to transform 
another country’s political economy and ideology than that of Chile after the military coup of 
1973. The impact of a self-conscious American state strategy, with sustained support from the 
Ford and Rockefeller foundations, to transplant in Chile an economic ideology of free market 
competition surpassed the strategists’ own expectations: a country that was thoroughly statist, a 
decades-old welfare state, and recognised as the intellectual epicentre for Latin American 
‘structuralist/dependency’ thought, was transformed into a ‘laboratory’ for neo-liberal 
experimentation on a radical scale. The Department of Economics of the University of Chicago 
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was the vehicle for the secular missionaries effecting the transformation; the private Pontifical 
Catholic University of Chile (CU), was the selected bridgehead into Chile and, from there, to 
challenging the rest of Latin America’s attachment to the ideas and policy implications of 
‘structuralism’. The International Cooperation Administration (ICA, and later, as US Agency for 
International Development), was the initial inspiration and principal financier; Ford and 
Rockefeller supplied substantial additional research funds from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s. 
The result: the economists trained at Catholic University, with other right-wing Chileans, 
developed a secret plan in 1972 for a post-coup economic strategy, overwhelmingly supported 
the military coup, joined the Pinochet government and provided technocratic expertise for the 
brutal regime.
30
 The stated aim of ICA/USAID, Chicago, Ford and Rockefeller, and the ‘Chicago 
Boys’, created by these programmes, was Chilean economic and social development: instead, 
Chileans’ freedoms were curtailed, democracy destroyed, human rights violated. Chilean society 
became more unequal, and its economy indebted to international banks.
31
 
 
There is, however, another aspect of this matter that requires exploration if one is fully to 
understand the impact of American foundations on Chile: the fact that, alongside funding free 
market economics thinking, they also funded the economists of the ‘centre’ and ‘left’ who 
championed structuralist ideas. Chile’s ‘statism’, however, was less an article of faith in 
‘socialism’, even less Marxism, than the institutionalisation of a policy adopted to meet the 
demands of the economic crisis of the 1930s which, it will be recalled, generated statist 
responses the world over. ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America) fully recognised 
the necessity of developing a strong private sector alongside an interventionist state. This was to 
have an important bearing on US foundations’ economics programmes in Chile. 
 
The long-term consequences of American foundations’ Chilean ‘experiment’ were interesting: 
the construction of cadres of ‘opposition’ economists who would later become ‘governing’ 
economists  – in cases of funding for both ‘left’ and right’. Free market economists constituted a 
                                                          
30
 Juan Gabriel Valdes, Pinochet’s Economists (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995). 
31
 OECD, “Chile should create more and better jobs to cut poverty and inequality,” June 2009; at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3343,en_33873108_39418658_42514801_1_1_1_1,00.html; accessed 18 
March 2010. Chile is one of the most unequal societies in Latin America: between 1980 and 1989 the share of 
wealth owned by the wealthiest 10% of the population increased from 36.5% to 46.8%.     
10 
 
new intellectual/professional viewpoint previously missing in Latin America/Chile. The funding 
of centrist/leftist i.e., statist, economists, in the long-run, maintained and developed cadres who 
would eventually replace the Chicago boys in Chile, once political democracy was restored in 
the 1990s. The key point is that both schools of economists favoured by American foundations 
were part of a spectrum of economic beliefs featuring important overlaps: only the most extreme 
elements of the Chicago boys rejected the state in its entirety, and hardly any of the funded 
‘statist’ economists rejected the market or a significant role for private capital. Additionally, and 
highly significantly, the foundations were interested in promoting the most technocratically-
minded leftist/centrist economists, and consistently promoted the virtues of ‘apolitical’ research 
and scholarship.
32
 The military coup and regime, however, was to have important unintended 
consequences. For the first time, leftist and centrist Chilean scholars became unmoored from 
political patronage – their political parties were dissolved and their ‘state’ dismantled, forcing 
them into collaborating with scholars of differing political tendencies just to survive. 
Consequently, when they ‘returned’ to Chile, they were more overtly apolitical and more self-
consciously technocratic in outlook. Pinochet’s economists, who had always championed a 
technocratic approach, now were ‘opposed’ by technocrats of the ‘left’ and ‘centre’. This, too, 
was significant and linked with US foundation largesse: many of the exiled Chilean social 
scientists were ‘housed’ in research institutes that were funded by international agencies, 
including the leading American philanthropies.
33
 
By the late 1980s and 1990s, of course, the statist-left the world over had abandoned as 
untenable many of its ideological/political attachments to statism and embraced a watered-down 
version of market economics, particularly in the conditions of globalisation. This helps explain 
the rightward shift to privatisation etc.. of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil, a 
former left-of-centre ‘dependista’. In short, the ideological spectrum of beliefs in regard to 
economic policy and strategy had narrowed from the 1970s to choices between variations of 
market capitalism, with an ‘enabling’ state rather than an interventionist one. The long-term 
consequences of foundation-sponsored economics in Chile and Latin America more generally, 
conditioned by changing political circumstances, economic and financial crises, and the onset of 
                                                          
32
 Patricio Silva, “Technocrats and Politics in Chile: from the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks,” Journal of Latin 
American Studies 23 (2) May 1991, 385. 
33
 Silva. 
11 
 
globalisation, were significantly to marginalise socialist options and narrow the range of 
economic strategies to choices between capitalist market strategies.
34
 US foundations sustained a 
strong, largely centrist, internationally-connected counter-hegemonic intellectual-political 
network in Chile that gradually came to accept the neo-liberal model, with a social dimension, by 
the late 1980s.
35
  
As noted earlier, US state strategy was to undermine and replace dependency theory. 
Dependistas – of various tendencies – promoted nationalistic capitalist economic development 
strategies based on state-led-industrialisation, high tariffs on imports, import-substitution, 
welfare states, and so on.
36
 The practical implementation of this theory meant restrictions on US 
trade with LA/Chile, high taxes on foreign investment, nationalisation of foreign investment on 
occasion, fixed exchange rates, and laws restricting repatriation of MNCs profits.  
 
ECLA championed dependista thought, developed by Raul Prebisch, a former central banker 
from Argentina, who headed ECLA from 1951. In order to undermine ECLA, seen as too “left 
wing” by the American state, the United States engaged in a two-pronged strategy: first through 
the Organization of American States; and secondly, through funding free market economics 
through the ICA-inspired University of Chicago-Catholic University of Chile linkage.
37
 Both 
Rockefeller and Ford backed the ICA/USAID programme for many years. RF and FF also 
backed economics at the University of Chile which was more attached to dependista schools of 
thought and supplied economists to various governments of the centre and left, including 
Eduardo Frei in the mid-late 1960s and Allende in the early 1970s.  
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The meaning of ‘political’ for Ford requires some clarification. While policy-oriented research 
was supported by large grants, Ford tried to steer away social scientists from open party political 
activity. Policy-oriented research was defined as non-political and technocratic: it could and 
would form the basis of policy-related advice to official policy-makers. However, electoral 
activity, partisanship, ideological warfare with opponents in or beyond the academy, was treated 
with some suspicion, particularly from the ‘left’ but also, later, from the ‘right’. Ford wanted, in 
effect, to transplant into Chile an ‘American’ model of the policy-oriented social scientist: one 
who could serve any mainstream political party or administration by providing ‘objective’ advice 
based on certified professional expertise that eschewed ideology and politics. The implication 
was that objective, impartial and scientific knowledge was possible, desirable and superior and 
the only basis of developing a modern state, polity, society, and economy. Party politics, on the 
other hand, was motivated by power and hence corrupt and divisive, a source of instability. At 
the heart of this analysis lay the experience of the United States itself in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, when American elites were themselves involved in a ‘search for order’, 
an end to partisan struggles, ‘pork-barrel’ politics and the ‘tyranny of the majority’. It is in this 
narrowly-defined sense that Ford and other American foundations claimed to be non-political. 
Hence, their hopes and plans for a ‘pluralist’ and professionalised Chilean social scientific 
community were not seen as in any way ‘political’ – the exercise of influence to affect outcomes. 
They were seen as ‘technical’ adjustments and developments necessitated by the objective 
requirements of ‘modernisation’. 
 
Ford funding for projects in Chile totalled $22.5 million between 1960-70, according to Peter 
Bell. Ford was funding, by 1970, “approximately half of all Chileans now studying for their 
doctorates in the United States.”38 Some $3 million had been granted directly to the (private) 
Catholic University and $3.3 million directly to the (state) University of Chile.
39
 In addition, 
there was a $10 million ‘convenio’ or collaboration between the University of California and the 
University of Chile, principally in the ‘hard’ sciences and engineering.40 Bell conceded that Ford 
had granted no funds to the “Communist-led State Technical University” despite its having twice 
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the number of students as the private Catholic University.
41
 Other Ford officials also 
acknowledged that the Foundation had created few, if any, fellowship opportunities for Marxist 
or communist scholars.
42
 This is, of course, quite instructive of Ford intentions of building the 
basis of complementarity, under the guise of pluralism, of academic institutions and outlooks in 
Chile, specifically Santiago, which Bell refers to as “the Geneva of Latin America”, due to the 
concentration of international organisations’ regional offices.43 
 
 
Jeffrey Puryear, a senior Ford Foundation official, fully recognises the power of networks as a 
technology of (democratic) change in his book on Chile’s intellectual communities. His 
conclusion is especially noteworthy, particularly from the perspective of the central argument 
about network power – as an end in itself and as the means of attaining ends otherwise not 
publicly stated by American philanthropy. Puryear suggests funding bodies establish “networks 
even when their precise impact cannot be determined in advance” (emphasis added). Such 
networks – composed of well trained scholars, “institutions, standards, colleagues, debate, and 
international contacts” were “a stock of high-level human resources” for the time when 
“democracy returned”. “Sustained investment in creating a stock of talented social scientists can 
qualitatively change a country’s political culture and its political technocracy.”44 
 
Globalisation and Global Civil Society 
The historical experience of the Big 3 foundations of building national and international 
networks finds its contemporary expression in the hectic bid to create a global order that suits, 
extends and defends globalising capitalism.
45
 As Thomas Friedman argues, the world today is 
characterised by “integration and webs” as well as an unequal distribution of benefits. Effective 
globalisation requires global institutional architecture as well as supportive global civil society, 
for the same reasons that an industrialising and ‘nationalising’ America 100 years ago required a 
national civil society – a series of densely networked publics composed of strategic minorities – 
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to provide its social base. The Big 3 foundations, among other newer American foundations, are 
at the very heart of these developments today. They are actively supporting existing international 
organisations and promoting new organisations more suited to global conditions. The overall 
strategy remains unchanged, even as programmes and personnel change: Americanised or 
American-led globalisation remains the aim. It is also clear, however, that American foundations 
are not alone in this venture, though they remain the most significant. 
 
American philanthropy tops the world league, although foundations are now a feature of 
practically every continent. Since 1987, the number of foundations in the U.S. has grown from 
28,000 to about 50,000. The new foundations hold some of the enormous growth in wealth in the 
1990s. Their assets expanded from $115 billion in 1987 to over $300 billion, and their 
international giving topped $3 billion in 2002. Record increases in international giving were 
recorded from the mid-1990s, due to the rise of new fortunes, especially Bill Gates’s Microsoft 
Corporation, as witnessed by the formation of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
46
 The 
terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, however, dealt a temporary blow to the trend, although 
they focused greater attention among foundations on the global sources of domestic problems.
47
  
 
Increasingly, European, Japanese and Australian foundations are engaging in international 
activities. There are over 60,000 foundations currently operating in the “old 15” EU states. In 
Italy, of the over 3000 foundations surveyed by the European Foundation Centre (EFC), half 
were founded after 1999. Over 40% of German foundations were set up in the decade up to 
2004. Their combined assets total over £100 billion, with the Wellcome Trust topping the league 
with assets of £10 billion. Increasingly, European foundations are engaging in cross-border and 
global activities, with 30% already doing so and 68% expressing an interest in doing so in the 
future. Further legal reforms to simplify and incentivise international philanthropy is the subject 
of reform campaigns backed by the major foundation networks. The EFC’s Europe in The World 
initiative – to project European philanthropic and political-cultural influence onto a global stage 
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– is driving increased linkages between European foundations and international organisations 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, UN Development Program), 
corporations, and an array of global networks such as Transatlantic Community Foundation 
Network and Network of European Foundations for Innovative Cooperation. The world is dense 
with foundations, foundation networks, and networks of networks.
48
 
 
In the era of America’s rise to globalism, the foundations constructed and promoted, at home and 
abroad, liberal-internationalist versions of Americanism. In the era of globalisation, they 
promote a “transnationalised” Americanism, including through supporting and collaborating with 
European and other world-regional corporate philanthropies, that backs the neo-liberal project 
but seeks to blunt its harsher edges.
49
 The foundations today are replicating their historical 
strategies at home and abroad; they seek to protect the existing system of power by engaging in 
activities to ameliorate the negative consequences of that very system of which they are a central 
component and beneficiaries.
50
  As a “Break-out session [on] Globalization” at a meeting of the 
International Network for Strategic Philanthropy (INSP) concluded, “foundations portfolios have 
benefited from globalization.”51 At the beginning of the twentieth-century, the foundations 
targetted the alleviation of domestic poverty and the slum – brought on by urbanisation and 
capitalist industrialisation; today they focus on the world-wide social fallout of neo-liberal 
globalisation.
52
 
 
The IMF and the World Bank are widely considered, along with the US Treasury, to be the 
motors of neoliberal globalisation.
53
 Founded at Bretton Woods in 1944-45 with full support 
from the Rockefeller/Carnegie foundations, they continue to garner sustenance from east coast 
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philanthropy. As is shown below, the World Bank has received grants from the Ford Foundation, 
while David Rockefeller has been a consistent IMF stalwart.
54
  
 
As was historically the case when American foundations often carried out programmes that the 
state would not or could not, it is also the case today – with the dramatic loss of state legitimacy 
associated with Reagonomics and Thatcherism - that non-state actors are scurrying to perform 
key functions. Offsetting the fallout of increasing gaps between rich and poor has become a key 
foundation task, especially by backing “pivotal institutions that can shape behaviour away from 
risk factors and dangerous directions [i.e., anti-Americanism and anti-globalisation protests],” 
according to the Carnegie Corporation.
55
 Part of the solution is seen to lie in “promoting 
democracy, market reform and the creation of civil institutions…”56, that is, in the neo-liberal 
project itself. Carnegie actively promoted, during the 1990s, “Partnerships for Global 
Development”, headed by prestigious academics and politicians, that promoted liberalisation of 
markets as a core concern.
57
 Contrary to Peet et al, neo-liberal globalisation’s foundation-backers 
do not see a wide gulf between neo-liberalism and its critics: by their social amelioration 
policies, they hope/claim to promote the market and social justice.
58
  
 
The Rockefeller Foundation declared in 1985 that social inequality reduction lay at the heart of 
its economic developmental concerns. In 1999, the incoming president of RF, former vice-
chancellor of the University of Sussex, Gordon Conway, stressed that the foundation had two 
priorities: “first, to understand the processes of change spurred by globalization and second, to 
find ways that the poor and excluded will not be left out.” Inherent in foundations’ attitudes is 
the taken-for-granted neo-liberal character of globalisation.
59
 Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
the third of what some may call an “unholy trinity”, the Ford Foundation, granted the Hudson 
Institute, a conservative think tank, $150,000 to assist “economists and officials of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania [to] develop plans to transform their economies and integrate them into the 
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world economy.”60 To examine the consequences of market reforms, Rockefeller administered a 
project, at a cost of $150,000, toward “an exploration on trade liberalization and its impacts on 
poor farmers.”61 
 
American foundations support the key engines of globalisation. For example, Ford awarded a 
grant of $400,000 to the World Bank to fund the latter’s “Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poorest to develop the capacity of microfinance institutions and improve member donor practices 
in supporting microfinance.”62 Microfinance is a strategy for lifting into the marketplace those 
too poor to get loans from mainstream commercial banks. The Ford Foundation claims some 
credit for the development of micro-credit in Bangladesh, the forerunner of the Grameen banking 
system. Critics argue that Grameen has hardly dented poverty, increased poor family 
indebtedness, and played into the hands of corporate investors.
63
 In 1999, RF granted $800,000 
to the World Bank’s Economic Development Institute for economic growth acceleration 
strategies.
64
 Further Ford grants were made in 2003 to institutions that try to build 
interconnections between large Western corporations and small enterprises in the Third World.
65
 
During the 1990s, the head of the Rockefeller family – David Rockefeller – offered 
unconditional support for the IMF’s global programmes, without which the world would return 
to the economic crises of the 1930s and the threat of global economic and military conflicts.
66
 A 
grant of $250,000 aimed to finance “strategic workshops and meetings among Asian government 
officials, academics and civil society groups on the governance of the World Trade 
Organisation”, indicative of historic US foundations’ role in supplementing decreasing state 
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levels of funding for international organisations, and the neo-liberal era penchant for 
governance/rule of law aid programmes.
67
 
 
American foundations are globalising forces in their own right too,
68
 consciously strengthening 
global knowledge networks between universities, think tanks, government agencies, and 
philanthropies.
69
 The International Network for Strategic Philanthropy (INSP) – set up by the 
German Bertelsmann Foundation – with US foundations’ support – encourages the global spread 
of philanthropy. The (American) Philanthropy Initiative, Inc., aims to ensure the “strategic and 
systematic investment of private philanthropic resources to address complex, interconnected 
manifestations of chronic underdevelopment”. RF has backed several initiatives to train a new 
generation of global givers. Similar programmes are run by the Ford, Hewlett, Kellogg and 
Charles Stewart Mott Foundations. Even philanthropy-strengthening groups have access to a 
network of support groups such as the Council on Foundations and the European Foundation 
Center. Global givers are further networked with regional and national philanthropies, such as 
the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, and to international networks and associations, such 
as the World Economic Forum which, in turn, has its own global social investors programme.
70
  
 
In that context, the grants information that follows is the tip of a very large iceberg. The Ford 
Foundation granted $400,000 to the Academy for the Development of Philanthropy in Poland 
(ADPP) – which grew out of a USAID project - in order to strengthen foundations locally. A 
Ford grant of $220,000 supports efforts to link-up Polish and Belarusian NGOs. Relatedly, Ford 
awarded $500,000 to the Brazilian Association of NGOs to help organise the World Social 
Forum (WSF), a body developing “alternatives to current patterns of globalization.”71  
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The Ford Foundation is an enthusiastic though controversial supporter of the World Social 
Forum (WSF). Indeed, private corporate and philanthropic funders are the second largest donors 
to the WSF, acting as a brake on WSF’s critique of capitalist globalisation. FF has invested well 
over $1,000,000 directly in WSF to help it organise events and globally to disseminate its 
message.
72
  At its third annual meeting, WSF attracted 100,000 delegates from 156 countries – 
feminists, trades unionists, and so on. According to Michael Edwards, director of the Ford 
Foundation’s Governance and Civil Society unit, WSF changed the “terms of the debate about 
globalization…. There’s [now] an inescapable public debate about the role of corporations and 
the distribution of globalization’s benefits…. largely due to the W.S.F. crew.”73 WSF, with the 
FF’s and others’ sponsorship, promotes critiques of some of the “negative side effects of market 
liberalization: growing economic disparity, the privatization of health care and environmental 
degradation.” The ultimate aim, according to Ford’s Edwards, is a “global civil society” the 
influence of which would bear comparison to the impact of the Bretton Woods system formed in 
World War II.
74
 WSF aims to construct “an alternative development model and to construct a 
new form of globalization”.75 A Carnegie Corporation grant of $25,000 assists “dialogue on 
globalization between representatives of the World Economic Forum and the World Social 
Forum.”76 A Ford grant to the London School of Economics of $500,000 aims to help scholars 
explore “the depth of global governance and its accountability to a polity,” another reformist 
measure promoted by all three major US foundations.
77
 
 
The WSF, however, is the subject of much criticism. For example, MumbaiResistance, argues 
that WSF is funded by western agencies “to mitigate the disastrous projects of development 
cooperation and structural adjustment programmes” they have themselves organised.78 They 
claim WSF’s sponsors have co-opted anti-globalisation forces and channelled them away from 
“direct and militant confrontation… into discussions and debates that are often sterile, and 
                                                          
72
 Ford gave $153,000 to Internews Interactive, Inc., as part of its “Bridge Initiative on Globalization,” to assist the 
WSF to communicate with the World Economic Forum. 
73
 Suzanne Charle, “Another Way. Leaders of a global civil society chart an alternative to globalization,” Ford 
Foundation Report, Spring 2003. 
74
 Charle 2003. Edwards,(2004, 14), argues “humanizing capitalism” is the WSF’s principal role. 
75
Jose Gabriel Lopez, “Green Globalization,” Ford Foundation Report, Summer 2003. 
76
 CC Grants for Globalization Initiatives; CC website. 
77
 Grant to the LSE Foundation, 2003; Ford website. 
78
 http://www.ilps-news.com/central-info-bureau/events/mumbai-resistance-2004/why-mumbai-resistance-2004/ 
(accesses 6 May 2010).. 
20 
 
mostly unfocused and aimless.” Some participants at WSF meetings complain that they are 
expected mostly to “listen” to WSF leaders rather than to participate; the aim was “putting a 
human face on globalization.” The World Bank refers to the WSF as “a maturing social 
movement” and the Bank’s officials have been granted observer status at WSF meetings. WSF’s 
supporters included Brazil’s President Lula, head of the Workers’ Party and proponent of IMF 
policies and US free trade agreements, and opponent of peasants’ land struggles. WSF is, 
ultimately, a “safety valve” trying to blunt the harsher edges of capitalist globalisation.79 The 
2004 organisers of WSF meetings, in Mumbai, India, refused Ford’s donations because of Ford’s 
role in India’s Green Revolution which created and exacerbated the problems of poor farmers.80  
 
WSF meetings in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2007, attracted similar criticism from African organisations. 
According to one source, the meetings were dominated by mainly “white North[ern]” NGOs 
while Southern voices were under-represented. The meetings were also sponsored by large 
corporations with exclusive rights at WSF. Indeed, WSF meetings had the feel of a “trade fair”, 
while poor attendees were forced to take direct action merely to gain entrance to meetings. The 
atmosphere was decidedly apolitical and there was little in the proceedings to suggest that 
politics is principally about struggles between “the haves and the have-nots,” which, after all, 
was the point of the WSF.
81
  
 
A recent academic study of the Nairobi WSF concludes that WSF operates less like the leading 
force behind a counter-hegemonic project opposed to neo-liberalism, and more like a source of 
entertainment – a “court jester” rather than a “postmodern” prince. In developing ever closer 
links with organisations at the very heart of neoliberal globalisation, WSF has been co-opted by 
the very forces it was established to displace.
82
 Gramscians argue that the major states, global 
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corporations and philanthropies and other forces are a “a nascent historic bloc” that develop 
policy and “propagate the ideology of globalization”, even within organisations that are 
promoted as alternatives to it.
83
  
 
CONCLUSION 
American corporate ideology springs generally from the ‘interests’ of corporate capitalism but is 
the specific product of organic intellectuals in organised knowledge structures whose role it is to 
interpret trends and develop specific strategies to strengthen the existing order by managing 
change and to enhance the state’s ability to lead the world . In the period since the end of the 19th 
century, the role of complex ideological-knowledge networks has developed in quantum leaps 
via the development of the modern university, think tanks and corporate philanthropic 
foundations which, though formally private, play fundamental roles within increasingly 
articulated state-private networks.  
 
In the United States, corporate ideology is almost symbiotically connected with the core concept 
of ‘Americanism’ although calibrated to the specific political economy of the time. The core, 
governing state-corporate ideology is fostered, constructed and disseminated via knowledge 
networks organised, funded and promoted  by corporate philanthropy such as Carnegie, 
Rockefeller, Ford foundations and, currently, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
 
The argument of this chapter is that state-corporate ideology reflects, constructs and coheres the 
broader American social, economic and political order by variously developing ‘statist’ and/or 
‘market-led’ concepts according to the particular requirements of the American political 
economy, and that state-connected corporate foundations are at the forefront of this ideological 
process. The major foundations over the past century have changed from statist development 
strategies to market-led neo-liberal strategies as exemplified by the programmes of the Big 3 and 
the Gates Foundation today. The results, for the broad range of people at whom these 
programmes are targeted, as ever continue to be negative and even devastating. Yet, the image of 
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gates and other large corporate philanthropies remains untainted and almost beyond challenge in 
mainstream discourse. It is patently clear that the major corporate foundations are even more 
central to dominant ideological thinking and practice than during the ‘statist’ post-1945 era. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
